The operation effectively serves as a successful proof-of-concept for the "Axis of Resistance," demonstrating a method to suffocate satellite internet access previously thought to be immune to interference. The collaborative effort appears to follow a distinct division of labor: Russia supplies the heavy hardware, China provides the tactical "manual," and Iran serves as the testing ground.
The result is the near-total paralysis of approximately 40,000 Starlink terminals that had been smuggled into the country to bypass the regime's internet blackout. Prior to these events, the prevailing consensus in the defense community was that Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellations like Starlink were nearly impossible to jam effectively. Their defense relied on the satellites' constant rapid movement and their ability to "frequency hop" to avoid static interference. The blackout in Iran has shattered this assumption.
While SpaceX was previously able to counter Russian jamming in Ukraine through rapid software updates, the situation in Iran presents a different challenge. Experts believe the current disruption is a hardware-based "brute force" attack that software patches cannot easily circumvent. (Read More)
While SpaceX was previously able to counter Russian jamming in Ukraine through rapid software updates, the situation in Iran presents a different challenge. Experts believe the current disruption is a hardware-based "brute force" attack that software patches cannot easily circumvent. (Read More)
