Ending the Iran war could expose the Islamic Republic to one of its greatest vulnerabilities, experts say, as Tehran confronts a battered post-war economy that may strain its ability to finance the institutions underpinning its rule. From a strictly economic perspective, former US Treasury official and sanctions strategist Miad Maleki says the greater danger to the regime may emerge once the fighting stops and it must govern a country burdened by soaring inflation, reconstruction costs and years of economic decline. "If the conflict ends today, then you're going to see the economic effect of the war doing its work," Maleki told
Eye for Iran. "That would be very scary if I was an Iranian regime official, having to face the reality of a post-war economy."
Maleki argues Iran is already inside what he describes as a "tipping zone," where years of inflation, currency depreciation and economic mismanagement have steadily eroded purchasing power. The question, he says, is no longer simply whether the government can continue paying salaries, but whether those salaries still buy enough to sustain loyalty. "The salary might keep coming," he said. "You just won't be able to afford very basic needs." The scale of that pressure is reflected in official consumer-price data. In June, food and non-alcoholic beverage prices were nearly 134% higher than a year earlier, while prices for oils and fats rose about 278% and meat about 172%, according to data from the Statistical Center of Iran.
Those increases squeeze not only ordinary households, counterterrorism and security specialist Roger Macmillan argues, but also lower-ranking members of the Basij, IRGC conscripts and their families—people drawn from the same society on which the state relies to maintain internal security and suppress dissent. "The real question isn't how much damage a bomb can do," he said. "It's what happens when the money stops moving."
Iran's financial center of gravity
Military pressure has dominated discussion of Iran for months, with much of the debate centered on missile stockpiles, drone production and how long it might take Tehran to rebuild its military capabilities. Macmillan argues that focus overlooks something more fundamental. "They are built to absorb military pressure," he said. "But are they able to absorb payroll pressure?" His argument is not that economic pressure alone will weaken the regime. Rather, he says policymakers should focus on disrupting the broader financial ecosystem that allows the Islamic Republic to function, from government payrolls to military-linked economic networks.
"We need to be looking at the financial center of gravity, which is not just the payroll but also the military bonyads," he said. Bonyads are powerful quasi-official foundations that expanded after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, with some of the largest developing extensive holdings in sectors including banking, construction, manufacturing, agriculture and energy. Major foundations enjoy significant economic privileges and limited public oversight, and several are overseen by or closely connected to institutions under the Supreme Leader.
Some have also served as important patronage networks and maintained extensive economic links with Iran's political and security establishment. For Macmillan, the question is not simply how much revenue those networks generate. It is whether they can continue supporting rank-and-file security forces if inflation keeps eroding wages while the government takes on the additional burden of rebuilding a post-war economy. "What we need to look at is how we can remove the will, shatter the cohesion and the will of the foot soldiers from the Basij and from the IRGC, and separate them from the state," he said. The argument represents a different way of thinking about pressure on Iran.
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