Even under normal circumstances, we simply do not have the resources to simultaneously implement the two separate "playbooks" we have for a war in Gaza and a war in Lebanon.
To add to the challenge, conflicts and threats around the world have created a situation in which it is far from clear that the United States would be able to resupply us even if they wanted to.
On the home front, it means drastically limiting the interception of enemy projectiles to a predetermined list of critical locations. In that case, civilians will be on their own.
This painful policy cannot be adopted on the fly after we realize we are running out of interceptors. It requires a lot of thinking and preparation. And it's a move that goes against the grain so much that we need our decision-makers and the entire command and operations structure to drill the scenario to the point that the orders will actually be issued and followed.
Limited resources would also compel the IDF to revise the choice of targets for maximum impact at costs which, in a single-front scenario, would not even be considered.
It's "hands off" when the top Hamas military command sits in a bunker underneath a Gaza hospital in a single-front conflict. It is possible that the policy should be different in the scenarios DM Gallant is worried about.
We must think through these and other operations now and not on the fly because if such tactics are required, we have to know both how the IDF pulls it off and how we handle the international backlash for doing what we have to do.
Israel's defense industry should already be gearing up for the challenge. Every day could be critical.
The talk of a multiple-front war isn't just some throwaway line in the debate over judicial reform.
It's a very real and critical challenge that must be addressed without delay.
