Deposed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad – like his father, Hafez Assad before him – was a very bad actor. Brutal, vicious, and implacably hostile to Israel. But he was also predictable. Hafez Assad, throughout his long tenure, and Bashar Assad at least until the Syrian civil war and the deep Iranian and Hezbollah entrenchment that followed, operated within clear and familiar parameters. Israel never liked the Assads, but it could read them – and in the Middle East, that counts for a great deal.
One of the clearest expressions of that predictability was the assumption, proven over time, that Damascus would respect the 1974 Disengagement Agreement lines. And it did. For decades, that border held. Israel had concerns along its borders with Lebanon and, at times, Jordan – but not with Syria. The arrangements along the Golan Heights were treated as almost inviolate.
That predictability vanished overnight when Assad was overthrown and fled to Russia in November 2024.In its place came uncertainty – and uncertainty in a fragmented state crowded with armed groups, many of them openly hostile to Israel. Within days of Assad’s fall, Israel moved decisively: destroying Syria’s air force, navy, and heavy weapons depots to prevent them from falling into dangerous hands, and taking control of a wide swath of southern Syrian territory, including the Syrian side of Mount Hermon.
The rationale was simple. Israel had no idea who would ultimately control Syria – or even which parts of it – and could not risk strategic areas so close to its border falling into the hands of Iranian-allied militias, Hezbollah, jihadist factions, or ISIS. That background is important for appreciating the significance of the US-mediated talks that resumed this week in Paris, aimed at forging a new Israeli-Syrian security arrangement. (Read More)
